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Abstract
We analyze the behavior of foreign banks who sequentially provide credit to ﬁnance
projects in an emerging market. The foreign banks are exposed to both micro-economic
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too easily and that this behavior may precipitate the onset of a currency crisis. We
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In recent years, several countries around the world have gone through a type of international
economic crisis that is often referred to as a “currency crisis”: the “Tequila crisis” in 1994-
5, the “Asian crisis” in 1997, the “Russian crisis” in 1998, and the Latin American crisis
in 1999.1 Despite their ominous name, such international economic crises do not seem to
be particularly rare or unique events. In fact, Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996, p. 20),
for example, count as many as eighty to a hundred ﬁnancial crises over the past quarter
century.2 All these so called currency crises commonly require the presence of three essential
“ingredients”: a debtor country, foreign creditors, and credits that are denominated in some
international currency, such as US dollars. While it is doubtless the case that it is the
interaction among these three factors that precipitates international currency crises, in this
paper we conﬁne our analysis to the issue of the behavior of foreign creditors.
Speciﬁcally, we focus our attention on the behavior of foreign banks3 and the logical
implications of three interrelated stylized facts. First, there is the phenomenon of herding,
by which we refer to a situation where foreign banks ﬂock to a few identical global “hot
spots,” such as emerging markets in Southeast Asia.4 Second, when a currency crisis occurs,
no creditor enjoys priority in access to the country’s international reserves. Finally, third,
due to the presence of ﬁxed costs, and perhaps for other reasons too, the competition among
the foreign banks is imperfect.5 Consequently, there are (excess) expected proﬁts to be made
and thus there is “competition for clients” among the foreign banks.
We consider a model where foreign banks ﬁnance local long-term projects by short-term
credits that are denominated in foreign currency. The foreign banks face two kinds of risk:
the “macro-economic” risk of a currency crisis, and the “micro-economic” risk of project
1Often, the sharp fall in the value of the local currency is the consequence rather than the cause of the
crisis, although in itself, the decline in the value of the local currency may contribute, sometimes dramatically,
to further deterioration.
2This number includes domestic ﬁnancial crises.
3Bank lending has signiﬁcantly contributed to the extraordinarily rapid growth and volatility of short-
term international capital movements in the 1990s. Moreover, as Eichengreen and Mody (2000, p.6) point
out, “international bank lending is particularly important for private-sector borrowers”.
4For example, Eichengreen and Mody (2000, p.12) report that out of 5115 LIBOR-based loans 3373 were
to East Asia.
5Hughes and Mester (1998) provide evidence that banks of all sizes exhibit signiﬁcant economies of scale.
Such evidence implies that there cannot be perfect competition in the banking sector.
1failure. We assume that the foreign banks move sequentially, obtain a private signal about
the micro risk associated with the projects they consider ﬁnancing, and observe the actions
of all previous foreign banks. We analyze the equilibria of this model and show that they
are generally ineﬃcient. In particular, for a wide range of parameter values, foreign banks
provide too many credits too easily and thus generate an ineﬃciently high risk of a currency
crisis. For other parameter values, foreign banks ineﬃciently provide no credits at all. We
demonstrate how the imposition of capital controls through taxes and subsidies on short-term
foreign credit can improve the situation.
In contrast to other papers on currency crises, we deal with the lenders’ side, not the
borrowers’ side. Neither do we consider the issue of the viability of ﬁnancial institutions in
the debtor country, nor anything else concerning the debtor country’s behavior. As regards
the lenders, we concentrate on foreign banks’ incentives for providing credit rather than on
their incentives to withdraw the credits supplied once a crisis is anticipated. Moreover, we
do not assume that foreign banks enjoy bailout guarantees.6 Finally, whereas most of the
literature explains currency crises as the consequence of causes that lie within the debtor
countries, the general message of our paper may be interpreted as placing part of the blame
on the international ﬁnancial community as well.
The results of our analysis have some implications with respect to the present debate
among economists and policy-makers about the costs and beneﬁts of “globalization,” at
least in as much as globalization is interpreted as implying the relaxation of constraints on
short-term capital inﬂows. We describe a clearly identiﬁed set of situations where imposing
controls on short-term capital inﬂows can well prove to be beneﬁcial.7 In addition, we sketch
6Schneider and Tornell (1999), for example, distinguish between two classes of models in the literature on
currency crises. One that assumes the existence of government bailout guarantees and focuses its attention
on the implied moral hazard problem for the foreign banks, and the other which involves the existence of
“multiple equilibria based on illiquidity.” (p. 4). Additional references are provided therein. See also Chang
and Velasco (1999), Furman and Stiglitz (1998), and Sachs et al. (1996). Diamond and Rajan (2000) present
a model where ﬁnancial institutions that are deliberately fragile in order to solve a commitment problem,
melt down in a bank run if an unanticipated shock occurs.
7Others have made similar recommendations. Krugman (1999), for example, writes “my own suggestion
is that governments actively try to discourage local companies from borrowing in foreign currencies, and also
perhaps from relying too much on borrowed funds in general (that is, reduce their “leverage”). The best
way to do this is probably by taxing companies that borrow in foreign currency.” (p. 165). This position is
shared by Stiglitz (1999) who has been widely quoted on the subject in the popular press (see, e.g., Louis
2a role for the IMF and the World Bank as coordinators of consortia of private banks.
The analysis proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the theoretical model. In
Section 3 we examine equilibrium behavior, and in Section 4 we study its eﬃciency properties.
In Section 5 we show that an informed reliance on taxes and subsidies can at least secure an
appropriately deﬁned second-best outcome and may even achieve eﬃciency. We oﬀer some
conclusions in Section 6. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a hypothetical “emerging market,” and a countably inﬁnite number of ex-ante
identical foreign banks. Each foreign bank is able to provide at most C standardized short-
term credits that are denominated in some “international currency.” The exchange rate
between the emerging market’s local currency and the international currency is assumed
to be ﬁxed, provided of course that no currency crisis has occurred. We assume that the
emerging market has within it 2C “investment opportunities” or projects, each of which
requires one standardized credit 8,9 and yields stochastic returns (predominantly) in local
currency. For the purpose of our discussion, it does not matter whether the foreign banks
provide these projects with direct ﬁnancing, or whether ﬁnancing is provided via domestic
local banks. We normalize the foreign banks’ opportunity costs of capital to zero, so that
they will want to ﬁnance local projects if and only if they yield a positive expected return.10
Below, we sometimes refer to the act of providing credit by a bank as investment.
Uchitelle’s article in The New York Times, December 2, 1999). Another proponent of taxing short-term
capital inﬂows to emerging markets is Eichengreen (see, e.g., Eichengreen, 1999, pp. 49-51). For a diﬀerent
view and for additional references see Edwards (1999).
8The assumption that the number of investment opportunities is 2C, and hence the number of credits given
is less or equal to 2C, is a simpliﬁe dv e r s i o no ft h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a tt h e r ei saﬁnite number of investment
opportunities in which foreign banks may possibly be interested. We interpret C as “a few,” and 2C as
“many” credits. Extending the model to include the case where the number of investment opportunities is
kC for some k>2, is cumbersome and does not generate additional signiﬁcant insights.
9An additional reason for why not more than 2C credits may be provided is the presence of negative payoﬀ
externalities. As will become clearer below, the provision of credit increases the probability of a currency
crisis thereby reducing the expected proﬁt of all provided credits.
10Notice that a positive expected return is suﬃcient for investment but not necessary. We assume however
that a bank does not invest if its expected payoﬀ is equal to zero. Our results do not depend on this
tie-breaking assumption.
3The game proceeds through three stages, the ﬁrst of which is divided into a large number
of short periods denoted by t ∈ {1,2,...}.I nt h eﬁrst stage of the game, the foreign banks
move sequentially, inspect projects within the country, and decide about whether or not to
provide short-term credit. The credits are short-term in the sense that they are due at the
second stage, but the projects can only be completed at the third stage.11 In the second stage
of the game, a currency crisis occurs whenever the country’s foreign reserves are suﬃciently
low relative to its obligations denominated in foreign currency.12 A currency crisis causes
those projects that are ﬁnanced by the foreign banks to be terminated at a great loss to the
foreign banks. If a currency crisis does not occur, the short-term credits are renewed, and
the game proceeds into the third stage. In the third stage, the projects are completed and
the foreign banks receive a payment that is positively related to the projects’ success.
A state of the world ω =( θ,λ) ∈ {θ1,θ2,θ3}×{λL,λH} = Ω is thus assumed to consist of
a “macro-component” θ ∈ {θ1,θ2,θ3} and a “micro-component” λ ∈ {λL,λH}. A commonly
known prior distribution Pr(ω) describes the probability of the various states of the world.
We assume that θ and λ are independent, that is Pr(ω)=P r ( θ)Pr(λ) for every ω ∈ Ω.
The macro-component θ captures the risk of a currency crisis (which may depend on the
total number of short-term credits provided by the banks), whereas the micro-component λ
captures the risk of project failure.
Consider the macro-component θ ﬁrst. We assume that when θ = θ1, a currency crisis
11We do not analyze the reason for why banks provide only short-term as opposed to long-term credit. One
reason, among others, may be incomplete contracting. For example, foreign banks may not be able to control
the riskiness of the project or the eﬀo r tl e v e lo ft h ed e b t o r ,b u tm a yb ea b l et oo b s e r v et h ed e b t o r ’ sc h o i c e
after a short period. A bank can prevent the debtor from choosing too risky projects or a low level of eﬀort
by conditioning the renewal of the short-term credit upon satisfactory performance. Similarly, short-term
credits enable a bank to react to additional information about the project’s proﬁtability that it may receive at
some intermediate stage of the project (Rajan 1992). Another reason has been recently stressed by Diamond
and Rajan (2000), who show that short-term ﬁn a n c i n gb ym a n yc r e d i t o r sm a ys e r v ea sac o m m i t m e n td e v i c e
for domestic banks. Additional explanations can also be given, however, for whatever reason, we note that
it is often the case that banks ﬁnance long-term projects through short-term credits in practice.
12Recent empirical work (see, e.g., Chang and Velasco (1998), Furman and Stiglitz (1999), Kaminsky et
al. (1998), Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and Tornell (1999)) presents evidence that supports the hypothesis
that a currency crisis is triggered by a country’s foreign reserves dropping suﬃciently low relative to its
foreign currency denominated debt. See Morris and Shin (1998) and Heinemann (2000) for a theoretical
model where this can be reproduced as the unique equilibrium outcome.
4occurs if the foreign banks have provided any positive number of credits. When θ = θ2,
a currency crisis occurs if the foreign banks have provided a total of more than C credits.
When θ = θ3, a currency crisis does not occur, regardless of the total number of credits
provided by the foreign banks. Thus, θ1 is interpreted as a “bad” event where the provision
of even a “few” credits triggers a crisis; θ2 is interpreted as a “intermediate” event where
only the provision of “many” credits triggers a crisis; and θ3 is interpreted as a “good” event
where even if many credits are provided, no crisis occurs.
These assumptions about the relation between a currency crisis, the number of credits
provided, and the event θ can be justiﬁed as follows. Assume that at the second stage of
the game, the ratio of the country’s foreign reserves divided by the total amount of short-
term claims is given by a random variable R(θ,γ), where γ denotes the total number of
short-term credits that international banks have provided by the end of the ﬁrst stage of
the game. Although additional credits may increase foreign reserves ceteris paribus, it is
reasonable to assume that the elasticity of foreign reserves with respect to short-term credits
is less than 1, i.e., that the ratio R(θ,γ) is decreasing in γ. Since this plausible assumption
is all we need for the subsequent analysis, we don’t model explicitly how reserves react to
outstanding debt. Following the literature mentioned in footnote 12 above, assume that the
ratio R(θ,γ) determines whether or not a currency crisis occurs. Speciﬁcally, assume that
if the ratio R(θ,γ) falls below a certain minimum, then “speculators” launch an attack on
the country’s local currency that results in a currency crisis. Note that according to this
scenario, the currency crisis is triggered by an international wave of speculation and cannot
be prevented by the creditor banks. Even if foreign banks were willing to renew their credits,
the currency crisis could not be avoided. Consequently, it is optimal for them to take part in
a “bank run” on the country’s foreign reserves that triggers the crisis once it occurs. Finally,
by providing short-term credits that are denominated in international currency, the creditor
banks inﬂuence the probability that a currency crisis occurs because the higher γ, the lower
R(θ,γ). We assume that the ratio R(θ,γ) falls below the critical minimum that triggers a
speculative attack whenever either θ = θ1 and γ > 0 or θ = θ2 and γ >C .From this the
relation between a currency crisis, the number of credits provided, and the event θ that we
assumed in the previous paragraph follows.
The micro-component λ is related to the projects’ success. We assume that conditional
on λ, all projects have the same probability of being successful, and interpret λ = λL as
5indicative of a low probability of success, and λ = λH as indicative of a high probability of
success. The implied correlation among the projects’ likelihood of success is motivated by
the fact that projects’ success is likely to be signiﬁcantly positively correlated in the type of
environments we consider.13,14
To summarize, we are interested in the three following events: (1) a currency crisis occurs,
(2) a currency crisis does not occur, but the projects mostly fail, and (3) a currency crisis
does not occur, and the projects mostly succeed.
We assume that before a bank decides whether or not to provide credit, it “inspects”
the projects and obtains a private signal about their associated micro-risk. The public
nature of macro-risks implies that all foreign banks are equally informed about them, and
have expectations that are given by the prior distribution. A foreign bank’s private signal
s ∈ {sL,s U,s H},s L <s U <s H, can either be low and indicative of project failure (s = sL),
high and indicative of project success (s = sH), or uninformative (s = sU), which is equivalent
to getting no signal at all. More speciﬁcally, letting Pr(s|λ) denote the probability that
a foreign bank observes the signal s when the state of the world is λ, we assume that
Pr(sL |λL)=P r( sH |λH) > Pr(sL |λH)=P r( sH |λL) ≥ 0, and Pr(sU |λL)=P r( sU |λH) ≥
0. That is, the distribution that relates the private signals to the state of the world is
symmetric so that good and bad signals “cancel” each other and are together equivalent to
the uninformative signal.
Recall that the ﬁrst stage of the game is divided into a large number of short periods
t ∈ {1,2,...}. In every such period t, one randomly selected foreign bank (bank t) observes
projects within the country, obtains a private signal, denoted st, about their chances of
success, and decides whether or not to provide credit (“invest”). Conditional on any bank’s
information, all projects are identical. Furthermore, by assumption, the probability of a
currency crisis depends only on whether the bank invests at all (but not on how many
13Consider for example the case of investments in holiday resort projects in Southeast Asia. The success
of such projects is highly correlated because it depends on common geographic and cultural characteristics,
as well as on other common variables that determine whether the country where the resorts are located
becomes an attractive international tourist destination.
14Since the projects’ success is correlated, the risk associated with λ may also be interpreted as a “macro”
risk. However, whereas a currency crisis is a purely macro-event, the projects’ success has a micro dimension,
as the previous footnote illustrates. At any rate, the point of the terminology is to help distinguish between
these two diﬀerent types of risks. It is not meant to have any further implications.
6credits it provides when it invests). Therefore, each bank will either provide no credits at
all or C credits. We denote the actions of the foreign banks by a ∈ {0,1}, where a =0
means that a bank declines to provide any credits, and a =1means that a bank provides
C credits. The action of the bank that moves at time t ∈ {1,2,...} is denoted at. The bank
that moves at time t observes the actions of all the banks that moved before it in periods
{1,...,t−1}, but not their signals. Thus, the information that is available to bank t consists
of its own private signal st and the history of actions ht−1 = {a1,...,at−1}. We assume that
this process continues as long as the country has not yet received 2C credits, and banks are
still willing to provide credit if they observe a favorable enough signal. The ﬁrst stage of the
game ends when either of these two requirements stops being satisﬁed any longer.
Foreign banks’ preferences are described as follows: A bank that does not provide any
credit enjoys a payoﬀ of zero in every state of the world. The payoﬀ of a foreign bank that
has provided C credits depends on the state of the world, and on the total number of credits
that have been provided by the end of the ﬁrst stage of the game, γ ∈ {0,C,2C}.I t i s
described by the function,
π (at,γ,ω)=

     
     
0 if at =0
y if at =1and a currency crisis occurs
xL if at =1 , a currency crisis does not occur but the projects mostly fail
xH if at =1 , a currency crisis does not occur and the projects mostly succeed
where y ≤ xL < 0 <x H.15 We assume that conditional on the state of the world, all the
foreign banks that have provided credits receive the same payoﬀ.16 In case of a currency
crisis, the payoﬀ to a foreign bank that has provided credit is negative (y<0). When no
currency crisis occurs, a bank’s payoﬀ is negative in case the projects mostly fail (xL < 0)
and positive in case the projects mostly succeed (xH > 0). Moreover, a currency crisis is
worse than project failure (y ≤ xL).
This model gives rise to three diﬀerent types of externalities. First, there is an informa-
tional externality that is due to the fact that the banks’ actions may reveal their signals,
which are valuable because they provide useful information about the true state of the world.
15Recall that the number of credits that the country has received by the end of the ﬁrst stage of the game,
γ, aﬀects the probability that a currency crisis occurs.
16Thus we assume that when a currency crisis occurs, no foreign bank has priority over another. Implicitly,
this implies that the banks cannot be distinguished according to the quality of their collaterals.
7Second, there is a payoﬀ externality that is caused by the fact that additional credits increase
the probability of a currency crisis and therefore reduce the expected payoﬀ of those banks
who have already provided credit. Finally, a “business stealing eﬀect” is present too. The
fact that the number of credits is limited, together with the fact that each bank that provides
credit expects a positive expected payoﬀ, imply that a bank that succeeds in approaching the
country early, eliminates the proﬁt opportunities of other banks who were slower to respond.
3. Equilibrium
Denote the set of all possible histories by H. A (pure) strategy for the banks is a function
σ : H×{sL,s U,s H} → {0,1} that maps the observed history of previous banks’ actions and
a bank’s own private signal into a decision about whether or not to provide C credits. A




τ , where ∆(sL,s U,s H) denotes
the set of all probability distributions over (sL,s U,s H), that maps the observed history and
a bank’s own signal at any time t into t−1 probability distributions (beliefs) over the signals
observed by the t−1 banks that moved before it, respectively. With slight abuse of notation,
we denote the strategy and belief of the bank that moves at time t by σt and βt, respectively.
We focus our attention on pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) (see, e.g., Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1994).
Deﬁnition. Ap r o ﬁle of strategies and beliefs {(σt,βt)}
∞
t=1 is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
( P B E )o ft h eg a m ea b o v e ,i f( 1 )f o re v e r yt ∈ {1,2,...}, the strategy of the bank that moves at
time t maximizes its expected payoﬀ given its beliefs about the signals of the previous banks
and the other banks’ strategies; and (2) whenever possible, beliefs are updated according to
Bayes’ rule.
We have the following proposition,
Proposition 1. (i) A pure strategy PBE exists;
(ii) in every pure strategy PBE, banks’ strategies are non-decreasing in their signals; and,
(iii) the ﬁrst stage of the game ends in ﬁnite time.
Recall that there are two ways in which the ﬁrst stage of the game may end. Either the
ﬁrst stage of the game ends because the maximum of 2C credits has been provided; or it
8ends because no bank is willing to provide any credit, regardless of its signal. In the latter
case, the banks “herd” on declining to provide credit.17 To see this, suppose that after some
history ht−1, bank t declines to provide any credit regardless of its signal. This implies that
bank t+1 cannot learn anything from bank t’s action and is thus in exactly the same situation
as bank t. Consequently, bank t +1will also refuse to invest regardless of its signal, and
the same is true for all future banks. Because of these related phenomena of informational
cascades and (rational) herding, where the available public information swamps the banks’
private information and induces them to behave identically, the ﬁrst stage of the game always
ends in ﬁnite time in spite of the fact that there are no search or inspection costs. Rational
herding depends on the assumption that banks’ actions do not perfectly reveal the banks’
underlying information. This assumption is satisﬁed if banks use standardized credits or if
the details of a credit contract are only imperfectly observed by other banks. Thus, in our
context this assumption seems to be plausible. Moreover, banks have an incentive to hide
their private signals, as illustrated by Example 5 below.
The herding phenomenon can help explain the reason so many banks invest in the same
particular country or region, whereas other, apparently similar, countries are overlooked.18
In our model this phenomenon takes the following form: with a high probability either it
is the case that two foreign banks invest C each or no foreign banks invest at all. The
probability that exactly one foreign bank invests is small. This is illustrated by the following
example.
Example 1: Herding. Consider the following stochastic environment: Pr(λL)=P r( λH)=
0.5, and Pr(θ1)=0 .01, Pr(θ2)=0 .04, and Pr(θ3)=0 .95. The distribution of signals condi-
tional on λ is given by Pr(sU)=0 .25, Pr(sL | λL)=P r( sH | λH)=0 .5, and Pr(sH | λL)=
Pr(sL | λH)=0 .25. That is, with probability 1
2, signals describe the true λ, with probability
1
4 they are uninformative, and with probability 1
4 they are misleading. Payoﬀsa r ea s s u m e d
to be y = −500,x L = −420, and xH = 630. It is possible to show that a perfect Bayesian
17Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) are the classic references on herding and informational
cascades (further references may be found in Neeman and Orosel, 1999). Chari and Kehoe (1997) show that
herding may lead to excessive volatility of capital ﬂows. Chari and Kehoe (2000) analyze several variants of
am o d e lo fh e r d i n ga n dﬁnancial crisis. However, their model does not distinguish between an international
currency crisis and a domestic ﬁnancial crisis.
18See note 4 for empirical evidence.
9equilibrium of this game exists where the probability that at the end of the ﬁrst stage of the
game exactly one bank has invested is only 1/32 = 0.03125, whereas the probability that
two banks have invested is 23/32 = 0.71875 and the probability that no bank ever invests is
1/4=0 .25.
The next four examples demonstrate the richness of behavior that is consistent with
the notion of pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This richness, which makes it
impossible to achieve sharp results, is due to the interaction of the three external eﬀects
that are present in the model. These external eﬀects pull in diﬀerent directions and their
interaction generates results that no single external eﬀect could generate alone.
The following example demonstrates that equilibria are not necessarily unique.
Example 2: Pure strategy PBEs are not necessarily unique. Consider the following
stochastic environment: Pr(λL)=P r ( λH)=0 .5, and Pr(θ1)=.05, Pr(θ2)=0 .25, and
Pr(θ3)=0 .7. The distribution of signals conditional on λ and the payoﬀs are as in Example
1. It is possible to show that there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where bank 1 invests
if and only if s1 ∈ {sU,s H}, and if bank 1 has invested (i.e., after the history h1 =1 )b a n k
2 invests if and only if s2 = sH. However, there is also another perfect Bayesian equilibrium
where bank 1 invests if and only if s1 = sH, and if bank 1 has invested (i.e., after the history
h1 =1 )b a n k2 invests if and only if s2 ∈ {sU,s H}.
The reason for the non-uniqueness of equilibrium is that in equilibrium, one of two banks
has to act “aggressively”, that is, invest after the uninformative signal, whereas the other
bank has to act “cautiously,” that is, invest only after the high signal. If the ﬁrst bank acts
cautiously, investment reveals that it has observed a high signal, and that allows the second
bank to act aggressively. Moreover, given that the second bank acts aggressively, the ﬁrst
bank is forced to act cautiously. On the other hand, if the ﬁrst bank acts aggressively, the
act of investment reveals less favorable information (as it reveals only that the ﬁrst bank has
observed either the high or the uninformative signal) and thus the second bank is forced to
act cautiously.
If a foreign bank has already invested, a second bank will invest if and only if it expects
a positive expected payoﬀ from doing so. By assumption, every foreign bank that invests
r e c e i v e st h es a m ep a y o ﬀ. Therefore, unless the act of investment of the second bank is
triggered by some additional information, the ﬁrst bank to invest cannot be deterred from
10investment by the knowledge that it will be followed by another foreign bank that will invest
after it. However, typically the act of investment is triggered by some additional information.
This may give rise to a “ﬁrst mover’s curse” that may deter investment altogether. We
demonstrate this in the following example.
Example 3: “First Mover’s Curse” may prevent investment. Consider the same
stochastic environment and distribution of signals conditional on λ as in Example 2. Suppose
that payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yy = −600,x L = −420, and xH = 630. It is possible to verify that
with these parameters, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium
no bank ever invests, regardless of its signal, in spite of the fact that E [π(1,C,ω) | sH]=
60 > 0.
We explain the fact that no bank provides credit in equilibrium in terms of what we refer
to as the “ﬁrst mover’s curse.” In the example, because E [π(1,2C,ω) | s1 = s2 = sH]=1 2
and E [π (1,2C,ω) | s1 = sH,s 2 = sU]=−72,i ft h eﬁrst bank revealed it has observed a
high signal, the second bank has an incentive to invest if and only if it has observed a
high signal too. The payoﬀs in the example are such that E [π(1,C,ω) | s1 = sH]=6 0and
E [π(1,C,ω) | s1 = sU]=−71.25,s oi ft h eﬁrst bank knew that no other bank will ever invest
after it, then it would like to invest if and only if it observed a high signal. Thus, investment
of the ﬁrst bank reveals that it has observed a high signal. Consequently, the second bank
invests whenever the ﬁrst bank invested and the second bank observed a high signal. Because
of the payoﬀ externality, this reduces the payoﬀ of the ﬁrst bank from 60 when no other bank
invests to 12. But because the ﬁrst bank’s expected payoﬀ conditional on its own high signal
and on a low or uninformative signal of the second bank (which in this case does not invest) is
E [π(1,C,ω) | s1 = sH,s 2 ∈ {sL,s U}]=−15, the ﬁrst bank’s expected payoﬀ from investing
after observation of the high signal is negative when it anticipates the behavior of the second
bank (which will invest if and only if it observes a high signal). It is given by
E [π(1,γ,ω) | s1 = sH]
=P r ( s2 = sH | s1 = sH) · 12 + Pr(s2 ∈ {sL,s U}|s1 = sH) · (−15)
= −3.75.
In a sense, the ﬁrst mover’s curse is reminiscent of the winner’s curse in auctions. In
both situations, the value of the object conditional on the private signal and other players’
11strategies is lower than the expected value of the object conditional on the private signal
alone.19 Moreover, since signals are private information, the ﬁr s tb a n kc a n n o tw a i ta n d
postpone its decision until it observes the second bank’s signal.
The “perversity” of the ﬁrst mover’s curse described in the previous example may in
turn give rise to a phenomenon were the arrival of unfavorable public information about
the proﬁtability of investments may deter future banks and therefore actually encourage
investment of the ﬁrst bank. We demonstrate this in the next example.
Example 4: Unfavorable public information may encourage investment. Consider
the following stochastic environment: Pr(λL)=P r ( λH)=0 .5. Suppose that before the
public signal is realized, Pr(θ1)=0 .25, Pr(θ2)=0 .15, and Pr(θ3)=0 .6, and after the public
signal is realized, all players’ change their assessments to Pr(θ1)=0 .3, Pr(θ2)=0 .2, and
Pr(θ3)=0 .5. That is, the probability of a currency crisis increases in the sense of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance. The distribution of signals conditional on λ is identical to what it was
in the previous examples and is given by Pr(sU)=0 .25, Pr(sL | λL)=P r( sH | λH)=0 .5,
and Pr(sH | λL)=P r( sL | λH)=0 .25. Finally, payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yy = −600,x L = −420,
and xH =6 3 0 . In the absence of the public signal, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which no bank ever invests (as in Example 3). However, when the public
information is revealed, it is possible to verify that there exists a unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which bank 1 invests if and only if s1 = sH, and no other bank ever invests.
The reason for this “perverse” eﬀect of public information is that it eliminates the incentive
of the second bank to invest after it has observed a high signal and, in addition, has inferred
that the ﬁrst bank has observed a high signal as well. In other words, the unfavorable public
information encourages investment because it eliminates the ﬁrst mover’s curse. Obviously,
a tax could have the same eﬀect.
As in standard herding models, in the model considered here, only actions (as opposed
to private signals) may be observed by future banks. However, one may think it plausible
that once credit is provided, the details of the credit contract may reveal, perhaps even
perfectly, the bank’s private signal. Thus, a diﬀerent model may be considered, one where
when credit is given, the private signal is perfectly revealed, and when credit is denied, the
19See Neeman and Orosel (1999) for an analysis of the combined eﬀect of herding and the winner’s curse.
12private signal may remain undetected. The main diﬀerence between such an alternative
model and ours is that in the former, it is possible to show that a unique equilibrium exists.
All other results, especially those about the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium discussed in the
next section, remain unchanged (provided the private signal remains undetected when credit
is denied). Furthermore, in such an alternative model, the presence of the negative payoﬀ
externality implies that banks have an incentive to try to hide their private signals. It is
precisely this incentive that motivates our assumption that the act of providing credit does
not reveal a bank’s private signal. The existence of this incentive is demonstrated in the
next example.
Example 5: Incentives to hide the private signal. Consider the following stochastic
environment: Pr(λL)=P r( λH)=0 .5, and Pr(θ1)=0 .1, Pr(θ2)=0 .3, and Pr(θ3)=0 .6.
The distribution of signals conditional on λ is identical to what it was in the previous
examples. The payoﬀs are again given by y = −600,x L = −420, and xH =6 3 0 . If investment
reveals the signal perfectly, there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium
bank 1 invests if and only if s1 ∈ {sU,s H}; and if bank 1 has invested after observation of
s1 = sH (thereby revealing, by assumption, that it has observed a high signal), bank 2 invests
if and only if s2 = sH. If only the actions can be observed, there is also a unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium bank 1 invests if and only if s1 ∈ {sU,s H}, and no
other bank ever invests if bank 1 has invested. Conditional on s1 6= sH, the expected payoﬀ
of bank 1 is the same in both equilibria, but conditional on s1 = sH the expected payoﬀ of
bank 1 is 64.5 in the ﬁrst equilibrium (where investment reveals that bank 1 has observed
the high signal), but 192 in the second equilibrium (where only the actions can be observed).
Obviously, bank 1 is better oﬀ in the second equilibrium and thus has an incentive to hide its
private signal. Intuitively, because of the negative payoﬀ externality the bank that invests
ﬁrst does not want other banks to invest after it. Thus, it has an incentive to hide a high
signal realization. Since it cannot selectively hide a high signal realization but reveal an
uninformative signal realization, it is better oﬀ when its signal is not perfectly revealed by
its action.20
20A frequent critique that is raised against herding models is that in many of these models agents have
no reason to keep their private signals secret, while revealing their signals would increase eﬃciency. As the
preceding example illustrates, this critique does not apply in our case since it is clearly not in a bank’s
interest to truthfully reveal its signal realization.
13The examples of this section illustrate how the diﬀerent externalities that we consider
interact. Without the payoﬀ externality banks have no incentive to hide their signals, and
if they reveal their signals the informational externality vanishes. Moreover, the equilibrium
would be unique. The ﬁrst mover’s curse, in turn, shows how the payoﬀ externality interacts
with sequential private information. As a consequence of this interaction, bad news or taxes
may encourage investment.
4. Eﬃciency
In this section we show that the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game are generally ineﬃ-
cient. Sometimes too little credit is provided (as in Example 3 above), but mostly, too many
credits are provided too easily.
Let W : {0,C,2C}×Ω → R describe the social welfare associated with supplying a total
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0 if no credits are provided
Y1 if C credits are provided and a currency crisis occurs
Y2 if 2C credits are provided and a currency crisis occurs
γ
CXL if no currency crisis occurs but the projects mostly fail
γ
CXH if no currency crisis occurs and the projects mostly succeed
where Y2 ≤ Y1 < 0 and XL < 0 <X H. The assumption that Y2 ≤ Y1 reﬂects the fact
that if more credits have been provided, more capital is lost and more projects have to
be terminated once a currency crisis occurs. The fact that XL and XH are multiplied by
γ/C ∈ {0,1,2} is due to the fact that the number of credits provided aﬀects the extent of
both the losses and gains if a currency crisis does not occur. In addition, we assume that
E [W (2C,ω) − W (C,ω) | λL] < 0. That is, conditional on project failure, social welfare
decreases if a second bank invests.21
An example for a social welfare function that satisﬁes the restrictions above is the one
21Notice that this assumption is equivalent to the following inequality being satisﬁed.
E [W (2C,ω) − W (C,ω) | λL]=P r ( θ1)(Y2 − Y1)+P r ( θ2)(Y2 − XL)+P r ( θ3)XL < 0. It can be
immediately veriﬁed that the inequality is satisﬁed if Y2 ≤ XL and Pr(θ3) > 0, which is very plausible.





for some constant K>0. Maximization of this particular social welfare function is equivalent
to maximization of the foreign banks’ total expected payoﬀs. It follows that there is no
intrinsic conﬂict between the banks’ objectives and social welfare (which would preclude a
socially optimal outcome a priori).
As a welfare benchmark, consider the best outcome that can be achieved when each
bank maximizes the social welfare function W subject to its information constraint and
all other banks’ strategies.22 That is, foreign banks’ strategies may depend only on the
observed history of actions and their own signals. We deﬁne this outcome to be the eﬃcient
outcome.23 The eﬃcient outcome is a reference standard against which we can assess the
equilibrium outcome and the outcomes that can be obtained by employing certain policy
instruments. However, when conceiving policy measures, incentive constraints have to be
taken into account in addition to the information constraints.
Strategies that induce the eﬃcient outcome are called eﬃcient strategies. A pure strategy
PBE is eﬃcient if it induces the same expected social payoﬀ as the eﬃcient outcome.
The following example conﬁrms the intuition that in equilibrium too many credits may
be given too easily.
Example 6: Too many credits are provided too easily. Consider the following sto-
chastic environment: Pr(λL)=0 .25, Pr(λH)=0 .75, Pr(θ1)=0 .1, Pr(θ2)=0 .2, and
Pr(θ3)=0 .7. The distribution of signals conditional on the state of the world λ is given
by Pr(sU)=0 .25, Pr(sL | λL)=P r( sH | λH)=0 .75, and Pr(sH | λL)=P r( sL | λH)=0 .
That is, with probability 3
4 signals fully reveal whether the projects are mostly successful
or not, and with probability 1
4 they are uninformative. Suppose that payoﬀst ot h ef o r e i g n
banks are given by y = −500,x L = −420,x H = 630, and social welfare payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb y
Y1 = −1000,Y 2 = −2000,X L = −840, and XH =1 2 6 0 . That is, W (γ,ω)=2
γ
Cπ (1,γ,ω),
22Equivalently, this outcome is the one that a hypothetical social planer who maximizes social welfare can
implement under the information constraints of the model.
23Note that the eﬃcient outcome may involve herding as banks may herd on denying credit, and that
they may do so in spite of the fact that the (unknown) state of the world would justify the provision of
additional credit and that collecting and revealing more signals (as opposed to actions) could indicate that
this is indeed the case.
15γ ∈ {0,C,2C}. It is possible to show that the following proﬁle of strategies achieves eﬃ-
ciency: (i) after any history ht−1 such that no bank has ever invested yet, bank t invests if
and only if st = sH; (ii) after any history ht−1 such that bank t − 1 is the ﬁrst bank that
invested, bank t invests if and only if st ∈ {sU,s H} (because the fact that bank t−1 invested
reveals that it has observed the high signal sH to bank t). Notice that along the play path,
since high and low signals are perfectly informative, the fact that bank t−1 observed a high
signal implies that bank t must observe either a high or an uninformative signal and will
therefore invest with probability 1.
However, it is also possible to show that in this example the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium has the following properties: bank 1 invests if and only if s1 ∈ {sU,s H}; bank
2 invests if and only if bank 1 has invested (i.e., a1 =1 )a n ds2 ∈ {sU,s H}; and no other
bank ever invests. Notice that when λ = λH, 2C credits are already provided by the second
period, but that this may also happen when λ = λL if both the ﬁrst two banks observe the
uninformative signal (with the conditional probability 1
16). Moreover, when λ = λL,a tl e a s t
the ﬁrst bank invests whenever it observes the uninformative signal (with the conditional
probability 1
4).
It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium strategies are diﬀerent from the eﬃcient
strategies and that credits are provided too easily in equilibrium relative to the eﬃcient
outcome. In particular, bank 1 and bank 2 both invest after the signal realization s1 =
s2 = sU, whereas according to the eﬃcient strategies neither of them should invest given
these respective signals. To see the intuition, note that if λ = λH, a bank will observe
the high signal sH with probability 1 in ﬁnite time, whereas no bank will ever observe the
low signal sL. Consequently, in order to achieve the eﬃcient outcome no credits should be
provided until a bank observes the high signal sH.24 In contrast, in any equilibrium a bank
will invest whenever the expected payoﬀ from doing so is positive and thus will invest, in
the example, even after the uninformative signal sU.W h e r e a se ﬃciency requires collecting
24As a consequence, the ﬁrst stage of the game will never end in this example if the eﬃcient strategies
are played and λ = λL, because in this case, no bank will ever receive the signal sH. But if we substitute
Pr(sL |λH )=P r( sH |λL)=0by Pr(sL|λH )=P r( sH |λL)=ε for some small positive ε,w eg e te ﬃcient
strategies that are basically analogous. The main diﬀerence is that if no bank has invested for a certain
number of periods, no bank will ever invest and the ﬁrst stage of the game ends. Another possibility would
be to introduce discounting or small inspection costs. Note that in both of these alternative models there is
a small probability of making a “mistake” from the ex-post perspective.
16more information upon observation of the uninformative signal sU, from any individual
bank’s perspective, collecting more information implies it relinquishes its proﬁt opportunity
to another bank.
Although Example 6 illustrates an important case, it is clear from the ﬁrst mover’s curse
that sometimes too little credit will be provided in equilibrium as well. In fact, a conclu-
sion that international banks provide too much credit everywhere would be problematic on
theoretical and empirical grounds. Banks have to reﬁnance themselves and may not be able
to provide “too many” credits to all creditors; and casual evidence does not give the im-
pression that all emerging markets are drowned with cheap captial by private foreign banks.
The ineﬃciency which the externalities of our model generate is not so simple that it can be
characterized by a statement like “banks provide too many credits.” Rather, banks provide
too many credits in some regions and too few in others. Whereas too many credits may
precipitate a currency crisis in one region, an ineﬃcient lack of credits may be harmful in
preventing or aborting an economic take-oﬀ in another region.
The presence of the information externality implies that the problem of identifying the
eﬃcient strategies is a diﬃcult one. Since there are three signals but only two actions, the
banks’ actions cannot always be made to reveal their signals. In addition, only “two shots”
a r ea v a i l a b l e ,s i n c et h eﬁrst stage of the game ends after two banks have invested. Notice
that with strategies that are monotone non-decreasing in the banks’ signals, at most two high
signal realizations can be detected, one through inference and one from direct observation,
before the ﬁrst stage of the game ends.25 When searching for an eﬃcient strategy, bank t
has to consider not only what the best action after the history ht−1 and its observed signal
st is, but also the informational content of its action that can be used by future banks.
Consequently, a bank’s strategy may be optimal not because of its “direct” consequences
for the expected social payoﬀ but because it facilitates the revelation of a particular signal
realization to future banks. As the next example demonstrates, sometimes this informational
externality may imply that the eﬃcient strategies are not even monotone non-decreasing in
the banks’ own signals.
Example 7: Eﬃcient strategies need not be monotone non-decreasing in the
25Detection of a high signal realization sH is possible if and only if the bank that invested ﬁrst had the
strategy to invest if and only if it observed sH.
17banks’ private signals. Consider the following stochastic environment: Pr(λL)=2
3,
Pr(λH)=1
3, Pr(θ1)=0 , Pr(θ2)= 1
12, and Pr(θ3)=11
12. The distribution of signals condi-
tional on λ is given by Pr(sL | λL)=P r( sH | λH)=2
3, and Pr(sH | λL)=P r( sL | λH)=1
3.
That is, the probability of the uninformative signal is zero. A signal points to the true state
of the world λ with probability 2
3, and is misleading with the complementary probability.
Suppose that payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yY2 = −1320,X L =0 , and XH =1 8 0 .26 Notice that since
Pr(θ1)=0 , the value of Y1 is irrelevant, and more importantly, a crisis occurs with a positive
probability if and only if at least two banks invest. The payoﬀs and probabilities in his
example are chosen such that conditional on two high signals, having only one bank invest
is optimal, but conditional on three high signals, having two banks invest is optimal. To see
this, consider the following table (where I denotes information, i.e. signal events):

















Conditional on two high signals, having a second bank invest decreases total expected wel-
















· 2 · 180 = 110, whereas conditional on three high signals, having a
















· 2 · 180 = 154.
Now, with monotone non-decreasing strategies at most two high signal realizations can be
detected before the ﬁrst stage of the game ends and thus with such strategies it can never
be eﬃcient for a second bank to invest. Consequently, it is straightforward to verify that
with monotone non-decreasing strategies, expected welfare is maximized when the ﬁrst bank






26The fact that XL =0(which violates our assumptions about the social welfare function W), simpliﬁes
the calculations but is not crucial. The same result holds if XL < 0 and |XL| is small. Similarly, Pr(sU)
could be positive.
27Note that this yields a higher expected welfare than if the ﬁrst bank invests only if it observed a high







18The following argument demonstrates that it cannot be eﬃcient for all strategies to be
monotone non-decreasing. Consider the following alternative strategies: (i) if no bank has
invested up to t−1, bank t invests if and only if st = sL; (ii) if one bank has invested before
t − 1,b a n kt invests if and only if st = sH and, in addition, the expected marginal payoﬀ
from doing so is positive, that is, E [W (2C,ω) − W (C,ω) | ht−1,s t = sH] > 0. According to
this policy, (a) with probability 1 at least one bank invests; and (b) because a high and a
low signal “cancel” each other, and the event that the ﬁrst three or more observed signals
are high has a positive probability, then with a positive probability a second bank invests
after four or more high signals and one low signal which increases expected welfare beyond
what is obtained when only one bank invests. It follows that the expected welfare from this
policy is strictly larger than 60.
It is important to note that although eﬃcient strategies may not be monotone non-
decreasing, strategies that are not monotone non-decreasing are not compatible with the
incentive constraints that self-interested banks impose on any policy maker. Under a proﬁle
of strategies that are not monotone non-decreasing, a bank may be asked to provide credit
if it observed an unfavorable signal, but is prevented from providing credit if it observed a
more favorable signal. The reason why this may be optimal is that the bank is “sacriﬁced” so
that the fact that it observed a particularly unfavorable signal becomes public information
and, perhaps more importantly, it allows to “signal” the observation of a high signal when
the bank declines to invest, allowing for a large number of high signals to be successively
signaled in this way. It is unlikely that banks will agree to sacriﬁce themselves in this way,
neither is it likely that any international body will agree to subsidize such sacriﬁce for all
the moral hazard problems it would raise.
The possibility that the eﬃcient strategies are not monotone non-decreasing prevents
us from obtaining a full characterization of eﬃcient strategies and outcomes. We are able,
however, to provide the following two results.
Proposition 2. Among all monotone non-decreasing strategies, the ones that maximize
social welfare are such that bank t invests if and only if less than 2C credits have been
provided so far, it observed the highest possible signal st = sH, and its investment increases
the expected social welfare conditional on the history and the observed signal st = sH.
It follows that if the eﬃcient strategies happen to be monotone non-decreasing, then they
19must coincide with the strategies described in the previous proposition. We are also able to
identify a general set of situations where eﬃcient strategies are monotone non-decreasing.
Proposition 3. Suppose that by some time t, either C credits have already been given,
or it has become clear that no more than C credits will ever be given. Then, as of time
t+1onwards, eﬃcient strategies are monotone non-decreasing. In the former case, until 2C
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for every τ = t+1,t+2,...In the latter case, until C credits have been provided the eﬃcient
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for every τ = t +1 ,t+2 ,... Furthermore, there exists a ﬁnite number K such that in both
cases, either C additional credits are provided by time t + K,o rt h eﬁrst stage of the game
ends.
We note that the situation where by some time t it becomes clear that no more than
C credits ought to be provided may be interpreted as one where investment is not very
attractive to begin with, perhaps because the probability of a currency crisis is quite high.28
Finally, we note that since by Proposition 1, PBE strategies are non-decreasing, a PBE
may be eﬃcient only if banks provide credit only after they have observed the best possible
signal s = sH. However, while investing only after observing the best possible signal is
necessary for eﬃciency, it is not suﬃcient. Even if banks provide credit only after observing
the best possible signal, PBEs are still likely to be ineﬃcient because the banks require in
addition that their expected proﬁts from providing credit are positive, whereas eﬃciency
requires that expected social welfare is increased. In particular, the second bank to invest
does not take into account the negative payoﬀ externality it imposes on the bank that has
already invested. The diﬀerence between these two criteria is likely to imply the ineﬃciency
of any PBE even if banks invest only after observing the best possible signal.
28This may be the case if, for example, even when λ = λH no more than C credits ought to be provided
because the probability of a currency crisis is too high when the country receives 2C credits.
205. Policy
While socially eﬃcient proﬁles of strategies may be identiﬁed, self-interested international
banks will not implement these strategies unless it is optimal for them to do so. In this
section we pose the question of whether there exists a “simple” policy that increases social
welfare. We assume that the policy maker can only rely on taxes and subsidies on short-term
foreign credits to induce or discourage investments. Speciﬁcally, we assume that at any time
t ≥ 1, the policy maker can impose a tax zt = z (ht−1) (or a subsidy when zt < 0), which
may depend on the publicly observed history ht−1 but not on the privately observed signals,
on bank t if it invests. Banks that do not invest cannot be taxed and receive no subsidies.29
We assume that the policy maker is capable of committing to a tax scheme z : H → R.30
Given this limited set of instruments, can the policy maker achieve the eﬃcient outcome or
at least improve upon the perfect Bayesian equilibrium?
It is important to note that due to the incentive constraints a system of taxes and subsidies
can only help in the implementation of bank strategies that are monotone non-decreasing
in the banks’ private signals. This follows from the fact that for any given tax zt, whenever
the expected gain to bank t from supplying credit after observing a signal st ∈ {sL,s U} is
positive, it is also positive when the bank observes the highest possible signal st = sH. Or,
E [π (1,C,ω) |{ (στ,βτ)}
∞
τ=1 ,z,h t−1,s t = s0] − zt > 0
=⇒ E [π (1,C,ω) |{ (στ,βτ)}
∞
τ=1 ,z,h t−1,s t = s
00] − zt > 0
for every s00 >s 0. This has the following implication. Deﬁne the second-best outcome as the
best outcome that can be achieved under the information constraints of the model and the
additional constraint that only monotone non-decreasing strategies may be employed by the
banks. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The second-best outcome can be implemented through a sequence of (his-
tory dependent) taxes and subsidies.
Given the richness of behavior that may arise in equilibrium, it is interesting that a
simple policy of just taxes and subsidies can, in fact, achieve so much. The reason is that
29Exemptions from (future) income taxes and (partial) state guarantees for the credits are in many ways
equivalent to a subsidy and are not analyzed separately.
30Notice that commitment should not be problematic in this context because it is always in the best
interest of the policy maker to follow the announced tax scheme.
21the tax scheme reacts to the information that can be inferred from the history of actions.
For example, it is feasible and may be perfectly rational to subsidize a “ﬁrst wave” of foreign
credits, but to tax a “second wave” (in order to prevent it).31 Furthermore, it is possible
that without taxes or subsidies no bank may invest because of the “ﬁrst mover’s curse”
(Example 3). As implied by Example 4, imposing high enough taxes on future banks may
eliminate this ﬁrst mover’s curse. Thus, a tax on a “second wave” of investments may trigger
a“ ﬁrst wave.” In fact, it may be the case that while no investment will occur in equilibrium
absent any taxes, the eﬃcient outcome (or the second-best) requires that both the ﬁrst and
later investments are taxed.32
As we have seen in the previous section, under some circumstances, namely when the next
C credits to be provided are sure to be the last ones, monotone non-decreasing strategies
achieve the eﬃcient outcome (Proposition 3). In those circumstances a system of taxes and
subsidies can therefore generate the eﬃcient outcome because such a system can guarantee
that banks invest exactly when they observe a high signal and investment increases social
welfare conditional on that signal. As noted in the previous section, one particular such case
is where the risk of a currency crisis is so “severe” that no more than C credits ought to be
provided.
Although by construction the tax scheme depends only on public information, a history
dependent tax scheme may nevertheless be regarded as “unrealistic.” The model implies
that there is still room for beneﬁcial economic policy. For example, the model makes clear
that an appropriately chosen upper bound on short-term capital inﬂows, a judicious tax (or
subsidy) on short-term capital inﬂows that is independent of history, or a combination of
these two instruments may improve eﬃciency, at least in expectation. An alternative route
is to encourage the international banks to form a “regulated cartel” in order to internalize
the externalities.
Finally, the IMF or the World Bank could assist countries in establishing the optimal
31If the expected social beneﬁt from investing exceeds the bank’s expected proﬁts u ﬃciently, it is rational
to subsidize investments that would not occur otherwise. However, if a bank invests when following the
eﬃcient (or the second-best) strategy, it necessarily reveals a high signal (Proposition 2). This may in turn
induce further investment that is not socially optimal and thus should be prevented by a tax.
32Taxing the second investment makes it unproﬁtable and thus eliminates the ﬁrst mover’s curse. Having
achieved that, taxing the ﬁrst investment as well may be necessary to prevent investment after observation
of only the uninformative signal.
22tax scheme. Alternatively, these institutions could initiate consortia of private banks, where
each consortium provides credits for a particular country or region. As the leader of the con-
sortium, the respective institution should have the contractual right to impose a fee (which
may depend on the history of actions and may be negative) on a bank that invests and to
redistribute the debtors’ payments among the members of the consortium. If the fee scheme
maximizes a social welfare function that is not too diﬀerent from the member banks’ ex-
pected aggregate proﬁts, an appropriate redistribution scheme will secure each participating
bank an ex-ante positive expected proﬁt and thus banks will voluntarily join such a consor-
tium. Since the IMF or the World Bank, respectively, could take interdependencies between
countries or regions into account, such a policy of “guided consortia” could be preferable
to individual countries imposing tax schemes separately. Moreover, it would leave provision
of credits to private banks, whereas it assigns the role of coordination to the IMF or the
World Bank. This seems to be an appropriate division of tasks between private and public
institutions.
6. Conclusions
The prevalence of currency crises in recent years gives rise to the question of who shares the
greatest responsibility for their repeated occurrence.33 Some argue that bailout guarantees
are the main culprits. Because of these bailout guarantees, creditors neglect to screen out
those projects that do not deserve to be given credit, too much credit is given, and the
likelihood that a currency crisis occurs increases.34 Others argue that the blame lies with
33Chang and Velasco (1999), for example, write “The recent literature oﬀers no shortage of villains to
blame for the ﬁnancial crashes in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, and Brazil: corruption and cronyism, lack
of transparency and imperfect democracy, misguided investment subsidies and loan guarantees, external
deﬁcits that are too large (or sometimes too small), ﬁxed exchange rates that are maintained for too long
(or abandoned too readily), poor ﬁnancial regulation, excessive borrowing abroad — the list goes on and on.”
(p. 1). Note that although many diﬀerent causes are listed, they all agree that the blame is with the debtor
countries.
34Schneider and Tornell (1999) identify a class of models in which government bailout guarantees and moral
hazard in ﬁnancial markets are responsible for currency crises. “Such distortions induce overinvestment in
negative NPV projects, which creates a hidden ﬁscal deﬁcit. Since such a deﬁcit is unsustainable, a crisis
is inevitable.” (p. 4). They cite Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Krugman (1998) and McKinnon
and Pill (1998) as examples. In their own model, “bailout guarantees can be a chief culprit in making the
23debtor countries who adopted “crony capitalism” methods when they industrialized or when
they liberalized their economies. This, in turn, raises the question of how those countries
which adopted crony capitalist methods succeed in obtaining credit in the ﬁrst place, to
which the answer is, again, because foreign lenders can count on being bailed out.
In light of this discussion, the general message of this paper may be interpreted as placing
part of the blame on the international ﬁnancial community as well. As we show, even if
foreign banks cannot count on being bailed out, they may still provide too many credits
too easily, which may precipitate the onset of ﬁnancial crises. Moreover, whereas bailout
guarantees unambiguously lead to too many credits, our analysis and the variety of examples
that illustrate it, show that the situation is more complicated and that ineﬃciency may result
in the provision of too few credits as well. Of course, the provision of too few credits does
not generate a currency crisis and thus is less visible. For the country, it need not be less
harmful, however.
Finally, we show in Section 5 that a judicious “correction” of the incentives of foreign
banks through taxes and subsidies may in fact improve overall eﬃciency and reduce the
likelihood that crises occur. The IMF and the World Bank could play an important role
either with technical assistance or as coordinators of consortia of private banks.
economy vulnerable [to a crisis].” (p. 28). This literature implies that preventing foreign banks from being
bailed out may eliminate the risk of a currency crises or at least signiﬁcantly reduce it.
24Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . We ﬁrst prove (ii), then (iii), then (i). Let γt =
Pt
i=1 aiC ∈
{0,C,2C} denote the number of credits provided to the country by time t. For every t, γt is
a random variable whose realization depends on the banks strategies and on the realization
of banks’ signals.
We show that in every pure strategy PBE banks’ strategies are monotone non-decreasing







τ=1 ,h t−1,s t
i
> 0.
Suppose there exists some PBE {(σt,βt)}
∞
t=1 where for some time t and some history ht−1,
the bank that moves at t invests after observing the signal s0 but not after observing the





















The ﬁrst inequality above follows from the fact that s00 is a better signal than s0 implying
a more favorable distribution over ω and the fact that the banks that move after bank t
cannot observe bank t’s deviation and therefore do not change their behavior. The second
inequality follows from the fact that {(σt,βt)}
∞
t=1 is a PBE. Therefore, bank t should invest
after observing the signal s00. A contradiction.
We now show that the ﬁrst stage of the game ends in ﬁnite time. That is, there exists
at i m eT<∞ such that γt+1 = γt for every t ≥ T. If after some history ht, either two
banks have already invested or no bank will invest in the future regardless of the signal it
observes, then the ﬁrst stage of the game has ended. Otherwise, since strategies are monotone
non-decreasing, if after a history ht−1 bank t does not invest, it must be that the signal it
observed, st, is either equal to sL or sU, which increases the posterior probability that λ = λL




τ=1 ,h t−1,s t
i
is non-increasing in
T, the limit exists.
25and thus decreases the expected payoﬀ that future banks can obtain from investing. It can
be veriﬁed that there exists a ﬁnite number k, such that the posterior expected payoﬀ from
investing conditional on observing k bad or uninformative signals and one good signal is
negative. Consequently, after k banks decline to invest, no bank will want to invest and the
ﬁrst stage of the game will end.
Finally, existence of a pure strategy PBE follows from the fact that the ﬁrst stage of the
game ends in ﬁnite time. A pure strategy PBE exists by backwards induction.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s2a n d3
The three lemmas below are used in the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3.
Lemma 1. At any t, it is never eﬃcient to provide a credit independently of the signal st.
Proof. Fix a time t,ah i s t o r yht−1, and a proﬁle of strategies {στ}
∞
τ=1 . Suppose that under
this proﬁle of strategies, the bank that moves at t provides C credits regardless of the signal
it observes. We distinguish between two cases: (1) C credits have already been provided by
time t, and (2) no credits have been provided by time t.
Consider case (1) ﬁrst. Denote r(ω)=W (2C,ω) − W (C,ω). Since C credits have
already been provided, providing C more credits will end the ﬁrst stage of the game yielding




















E [r(ω) | λH].
Notice that, by assumption, E [r(ω) | λL] < 0. In case E [r(ω) | λH] ≤ 0 the conclusion


























τ=1 ,h t−1,s t = ···= st+K = sL
¤
< 0.
26By assumption, the proﬁle of strategies {στ}
∞
τ=1 calls for the bank that moves at t to provide
credit regardless of its signal. We show that there exists another proﬁle of strategies that
generates a higher social surplus, implying that {στ}
∞
τ=1 cannot be eﬃcient. Speciﬁcally,
suppose that instead of providing C credits at t regardless of the signal and ending the ﬁrst
stage of the game, the banks follow the following strategies: every bank that moves at time
τ ∈ {t,...,t + K} provides credit if and only if it observes a signal sτ ∈ {sU,s H}. The banks
that move after time t + K do not provide credit regardless of their signal. We show that
this new proﬁle of strategies provides a higher expected social surplus than σ = {στ}
∞
τ=1.







=P r ( st = ···= st+K = sL | σ,h t−1)E [r(ω) | σ,h t−1,s t = ···= st+K = sL]
+(1− Pr(st = ···= st+K = sL | σ,h t−1))E [r(ω) | σ,h t−1,s τ 6= sL for some τ ∈ {t,...t + K}]
< (1 − Pr(st = ···= st+K = sL | σ,h t−1))E [r(ω) | σ,h t−1,s τ 6= sL for some τ ∈ {t,...t + K}]
which is equal to the additional expected social surplus under the new proﬁle of strategies
since in contrast to what happens under {στ}
∞
τ=1 , under the new strategies, no credit is
provided when sτ = sL for all τ ∈ {t,...,t + K}.
Consider now case (2). Fix a time t,ah i s t o r yht−1, and a proﬁle of strategies {στ}
∞
τ=1 .
Suppose that no credits have been provided up to time t, and that under this proﬁle of
strategies, the bank that moves at t provides C credits regardless of the signal it observes.
Under any proﬁle of eﬃcient strategies the ﬁrst stage of the game must end in ﬁnite time
with positive probability. Thus, if the proﬁle of strategies {στ}
∞
τ=1 is eﬃcient, there exists
a T such that with positive probability the ﬁrst stage of the game ends by period t + T.
Consider the alternative proﬁle of strategies {σ0
τ}
∞
τ=1 , which is deﬁned as follows: (i) for
τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1}, σ0
τ ≡ στ, i.e., the alternative strategy is identical to the original strategy;
(ii) the bank that moves at t does not provide any credit regardless of the signal it observes;
(iii) the banks τ ∈ {t +1 ,...,t + T} follow their original strategies στ as if bank t has invested,
until according to the original strategy proﬁle the ﬁrst stage of the game has ended or period
t+T, whichever comes ﬁrst; (iv) if according to the original strategy proﬁle the ﬁrst stage of
t h eg a m ee n d sw i t hs o m eb a n kτ ∈ {t,...,t + T}, bank τ +1invests regardless of the signal
it observes and the ﬁrst stage of the game ends thereafter; (v) ﬁnally, if according to the
original strategy proﬁle the ﬁrst stage of the game has not ended by time t+T,b a n kt+T +1
27invests regardless of the signal it observes, and σ0
τ+1 ≡ στ for all τ ≥ t+T +2. That is, after
bank t +T we “insert” an additional bank that invests regardless of its signal (“instead of”
bank t) and this additional bank is ignored by the banks that move later and follow their
original strategies. Notice that whenever under the original proﬁle of strategies {στ}
∞
τ=1 the




τ=1 it ends with bank τ +1 , without any diﬀerence in the public information
obtained. Otherwise play continues identically with a “lag” of one period. Consequently,










τ=1 the ﬁrst stage of the game ends with some bank τ ∈ {t +1 ,...,t + T +1 },
a strictly higher social payoﬀ can be achieved by some alternative (third) proﬁle of strategies.
Since the event that under the proﬁle of strategies {σ0
τ}
∞
τ=1 the ﬁrst stage of the game ends
with some bank τ ∈ {t +1 ,...,t + T +1 } has, by construction, a positive probability, this
implies that the proﬁle of strategies {σ0
τ}
∞
τ=1 does not achieve the eﬃcient outcome. But
then neither can the original proﬁle of strategies {στ}
∞
τ=1 be eﬃcient because it generates
t h es a m ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ as {σ0
τ}
∞
τ=1 . A contradiction.
Lemma 2. After any history ht−1, the following cannot be eﬃcient strategies for bank t :
(i) at =1if and only if st = sU; and, (ii) at =1if and only if st ∈ {sL,s H}.
Proof. Notice that the two investment strategies described above are not based on any
favorable information and they do not transmit any valuable information into the future.
They are thus equivalent to lotteries where C credits are provided with a certain probability,
regardless of the signal, and with the complementary probability no credit is given, regardless
of the signal. It is then straightforward to see that the previous lemma can be extended to
cover this case too.
Lemma 3. After any history ht−1 such that the next C credits to be provided will be the last
ones (either because C credits have already been provided, or because whatever information
is revealed in the future, eﬃciency requires that no more than C credits be provided 36), the
eﬃcient strategy of bank τ ≥ t is monotone non-decreasing in its signal.
36This may be the case, for example, if even when it is known that λ = λH, eﬃciency implies that no
more than C credits ought to be provided because the probability of a currency crisis is too high when the
country receives 2C credits.
28Proof. Assume the condition described in the statement of the lemma is satisﬁed from time
t onwards. By the previous two lemmas, it is enough to show that if for some τ ≥ t an
eﬃcient strategy prescribes aτ =1upon observation of sτ = sL it must also prescribe aτ =1
upon observation of sτ = sH.
Let σ =( σ1,σ2,...) denote a proﬁle of eﬃcient strategies. Suppose that for some τ ≥
t, στ (hτ−1,s L)=1but στ (hτ−1,s H)=0 . We show that there exists another proﬁle of
strategies, denoted σ0, that generates a strictly higher expected social surplus, implying a
contradiction. The proﬁle of strategies σ0 is deﬁned as follows: it coincides with σ everywhere,
except that σ0
τ (hτ−1,s L)=0 , and σ0
τ (hτ−1,s H)=1 . Let P = E [W (γ,ω) | σ,h t−1] denote
the expected social welfare under σ conditional on ht−1, and let P0 = E [W (γ,ω) | σ0,h t−1]
denote the expected social welfare under σ0 conditional on ht−1. In these expectations, γ
denotes the random number of credits that are being supplied at the end of the ﬁrst stage
of the game conditional on the history ht−1 and the strategy proﬁle σ and σ0, respectively.
Finally, let γ denote the maximum number of credits that may be given. That is, γ =2 C if
C credits have already been given by t, and γ = C if no credits have been given by t. Notice
that with slight abuse of notation, P c a nb ew r i t t e na s ,
P =P r ( sH | λL)Pr(λL | ht−1)E [W (γ,ω) | σ,λL]
+Pr(sU | λL)Pr(λL | ht−1)E [W (γ,ω) | σ,λL]
+Pr(sL | λL)Pr(λL | ht−1)E [W (γ,ω) | λL]
+Pr(sH | λH)Pr(λH | ht−1)E [W(γ,ω) | σ,λH]
+Pr(sU | λH)Pr(λH | ht−1)E [W(γ,ω) | σ,λH]
+Pr(sL | λH)Pr(λH | ht−1)E [W(γ,ω) | λH],
and that P0 c a nb ew r i t t e na s ,
P
0 =P r ( sH | λL)Pr(λL | ht−1)E [W (γ,ω) | λL]
+Pr(sU | λL)Pr(λL | ht−1)E [W (γ,ω) | σ,λL]
+Pr(sL | λL)Pr(λL | ht−1)E [W (γ,ω) | σ,λL]
+Pr(sH | λH)Pr(λH | ht−1)E [W(γ,ω) | λH]
+Pr(sU | λH)Pr(λH | ht−1)E [W(γ,ω) | σ,λH]
+Pr(sL | λH)Pr(λH | ht−1)E [W(γ,ω) | σ,λH].
29Consequently,
P
0 − P =[ P r ( sH | λL) − Pr(sL | λL)]Pr(λL | ht−1){E [W (γ,ω) | λL] − E [W (γ,ω) | σ,λL]}
+[Pr(sH | λH) − Pr(sL | λH)]Pr(λH | ht−1){E [W(γ,ω) | λH] − E [W(γ,ω) | σ,λH]}.
Observe that,
E [W (γ,ω) | λL] − E [W (γ,ω) | σ,λL] ≤ 0
because γ ≤ γ and when λ = λL it is better to provide as few credits as possible; and
E [W(γ,ω) | λH] − E [W(γ,ω) | σ,λH] ≥ 0
because γ ≤ γ and when λ = λH it is better to provide as many credits as possible. Fur-
thermore, since it cannot be that under an eﬃcient strategy, C additional credits are pro-
vided after t with probability 1 and hence the upper bound γ is always achieved, at least
one of the two inequalities above must be strict. Finally, the fact that, by assumption,
both Pr(sH | λL) < Pr(sL | λL), and Pr(sH | λH) > Pr(sL | λH), implies that P0 >P .A
contradiction.
We prove Proposition 3 before 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .We prove the Proposition for the case where after some history
ht−1, it becomes known that no more than C credits will ever be provided. The proof for
the other case is analogous. Let σ =( σ1,σ2,...) denote a proﬁle of eﬃcient strategies. The
previous three lemmas imply that we only have to show that there does not exist some
τ ≥ t, where at τ a bank provides C credits after observing the uninformative signal sU.
Suppose then that τ ≥ t is the last bank that optimally provides C credits upon observation
of the uninformative signal sU under σ. By assumption, all the banks that move after τ,
provide credit only upon observation of the highest possible signal sH, if at all. Such a last
bank exists because the monotonicity of banks’ eﬃcient strategies implies that for all large
enough t,
E [W (C,ω) | σ,a 1 = ···= at−1 =0 ,s t = sU] ≤ 0,
and it cannot be eﬃcient that bank t provides credit in such circumstances.37
37Investment upon observation of the uninformative signal sU in spite of a non-positive payoﬀ can only
be eﬃcient if it is important to “warn” future banks of the worst possible signal sL in the following way: If
30We show that a proﬁle of strategies, denoted σ0, that coincides with σ up to τ − 1,
and from τ onwards is identical to the one described in the statement of the proposition
and where bank τ provides C credits only upon observation of the highest possible signal
sH generates a higher expected social welfare than σ.L e t K∗ denote the smallest integer
number such that the bank moving at τ + K∗ +1would not provide C credits (provided
none were provided before) even if it observes the highest possible signal sH under σ. That
is, K∗ is the smallest integer number such that
E [W (C,ω) | σ,h τ−1,a τ = ···= aτ+K∗ =0 ,s τ+K∗+1 = sH]
= E [W (C,ω) | σ,h τ−1,s τ = sL,s τ+k ∈ {sL,s U} ∀k ∈ {1,...,K
∗},s τ+K∗+1 = sH]
≤ 0.
Note that K∗ ≥ 1.38
We let K0 denote the analog to K∗ under σ0.T h a t i s , K0 is the smallest integer such
that,
E [W (C,ω) | σ
0,h τ−1,a τ = aτ+1 = ···= aτ+K0 =0 ,s τ+K0+1 = sH]
= E [W (C,ω) | σ
0,h τ−1,s τ+k ∈ {sL,s U} ∀k ∈ {0,...,K
0},s τ+K0+1 = sH]
≤ 0.
The diﬀerence between K0 and K∗ is that in the deﬁnition of K0, we condition on more
favorable information, namely, the fact that no credit was provided at τ implies that sτ ∈
{sL,s U} as opposed to sτ = sL in the deﬁnition of K∗. It therefore must be the case that
K0 ≥ K∗.39 Denote the expected social welfare under σ by P∗. Notice that P∗ can be written
as,
P
∗ =[ P r ( sU | λL)+P r( sH | λL)]Pr(λL | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λL]
+[Pr(sU | λH)+P r( sH | λH)]Pr(λH | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λH]
bank t does not invest, it reveals that it observed the signal sL and this, in turn, conveys such “bad news”
that no future bank should ever invest, regardless of its observed signal. However, since the signals sH and
sL cancel each other, if a bank should not invest after the sequence (sL,s H) it should also not invest after
sU because the updated probabilities are identical.
38This is due to the fact that by assumption, E [W (1,ω) | σ,h τ−1,s τ = sL,s τ+1 = sH]=
E [W (1,ω) | σ,h τ−1,s τ = sU] > 0.
39This can be veriﬁed algebraically.
31+Pr(sL | λL)
h
1 − [1 − Pr(sH | λL)]
K∗i
Pr(λL | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λL]
+Pr(sL | λH)
h
1 − [1 − Pr(sH | λH)]
K∗i
Pr(λH | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λH].
Similarly, denote the expected social welfare under σ0 by P0.P 0 c a nb ew r i t t e na s ,
P
0 =P r ( sH | λL)Pr(λL | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λL]
+Pr(sH | λH)Pr(λH | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λH]
+[Pr(sL | λL)+P r( sU | λL)]
h
1 − [1 − Pr(sH | λL)]
K0i
Pr(λL | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λL]
+[Pr(sL | λH)+P r( sU | λH)]
h
1 − [1 − Pr(sH | λH)]
K0i
Pr(λH | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λH]
≥ Pr(sH | λL)Pr(λL | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λL]
+Pr(sH | λH)Pr(λH | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λH]
+[Pr(sL | λL)+P r( sU | λL)]
h
1 − [1 − Pr(sH | λL)]
K∗i
Pr(λL | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λL]
+[Pr(sL | λH)+P r( sU | λH)]
h
1 − [1 − Pr(sH | λH)]
K∗i
Pr(λH | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λH].
because K0 ≥ K∗ implies that when we substitute K∗ for K0 in P0 either we subtract some





≤ Pr(sU | λL)[1− Pr(sH | λL)]
K∗
Pr(λL | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λL]
+Pr(sU | λH)[1− Pr(sH | λH)]
K∗
Pr(λH | hτ−1)E [W (C,ω) | λH]
=P r ( sU | λL)E [W (C,ω) | σ,h τ−1,s τ = sL,s τ+k ∈ {sL,s U} ∀k ∈ {1,...,K
∗},s τ+K∗+1 = sH]
≤ 0.
because, by deﬁnition of K∗, the penultimate expression is non-positive. Furthermore, if
K0 >K ∗, the ﬁrst inequality above is strict; and if K0 = K∗, the second inequality must be
strict because
E [W (C,ω) | σ,h τ−1,s τ = sL,s τ+k ∈ {sL,s U} ∀k ∈ {1,...,K
∗},s τ+K∗+1 = sH]
<E [W (C,ω) | σ
0,h τ−1,s τ+k ∈ {sL,s U} ∀k ∈ {0,...,K
0},s τ+K0+1 = sH],
which by assumption is non-positive.
40In order to see this, recall that P0 is a series of K0 +1positive terms, where the k’th term is the
probability that bank τ + k invests times the conditional expected welfare from this investment.
32The last sentence of in the statement of the Proposition follows from the fact that when
strategies are monotone non-decreasing, there is a ﬁnite integer K such that
E [W (C,ω) | σ
0,h τ,s τ+k ∈ {sL,s U} for all k ∈ {1,...,K − 1},s τ+K = sH] ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that σ is a proﬁle of eﬃcient monotone non-decreasing
strategies. Because of the previous three lemmas it is suﬃc i e n tt os h o wt h a ti ti si m p o s s i b l e
that σ prescribes investment upon observation of an uninformative signal. Moreover, we
need to consider only the case that is not covered by Proposition 3. Suppose then that after
some history ht−1 bank t is the last to provide credit upon observation of an uninformative
signal, that no credits have been provided before t, and that the history ht−1 does not imply
that at most C credits will be provided. Such a last bank exists because, by monotonicity,
failure to invest for a suﬃciently long number of periods indicates that the probability of the
state λ = λH is so low that it discourages investment altogether.
For any t ∈ {1,2,...}, let Vt (γt,p t) denote the expected social welfare from continuing
to follow the eﬃcient monotone non-decreasing strategy proﬁle, conditional on the number
of credits provided by time t, denoted γt, and the probability of the good state λ = λH,
denoted pt. Consider an alternative strategy proﬁle, denoted σ0, that is identical to σ every-
where except that under σ0
t investment is made if and only if sH is observed and under σ0
t+1
investment is made if and only if either sH or sU is observed. The idea of the proof is ﬁrst
to show that σ and σ0 generate the exact same expected social welfare, and then to argue
that σ0, and thus σ, cannot be eﬃcient because, by Proposition 3, it is strictly suboptimal
to provide credit upon observation of an uninformative signal when C credits have already
been provided.
The following Table 2 describes the expected social welfare under σ as a function of all
the possible signal realizations in t and t +1: 41
41For the ﬁrst two lines of Table 1 note that because (by assumption) the history ht−1 does not imply that
at most C credits will be provided, the strategy σt+1 must prescribe bank t +1to invest upon observation
of a high signal, if bank t has invested. For the line corresponding to (sL,s H) note that the strategy
σt+1 must prescribe bank t +1to invest upon observation of a high signal, if bank t has not invested,
because it prescribes bank t to invest upon observation of the non-informative signal sU, and the information
I = {st = sL,s t+1 = sH} is equivalent to the information st = sU.
33(st,s t+1) expected social welfare conditional on σ and ht+1
(sH,s H) E [W (2C,ω) | ht−1,s t ∈ {sU,s H},s t+1 = sH]
(sU,s H) E [W (2C,ω) | ht−1,s t ∈ {sU,s H},s t+1 = sH]
(sH,s U) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sU,s H},s t+1 ∈ {sL,s U})]
(sL,s H) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t = sL,s t+1 = sH)]
(sH,s L) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sU,s H},s t+1 ∈ {sL,s U})]
(sU,s U) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sU,s H},s t+1 ∈ {sL,s U})]
(sL,s U) V [0,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t = sL,s t+1 ∈ {sL,s U})]
(sU,s L) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sU,s H},s t+1 ∈ {sL,s U})]
(sL,s L) V [0,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t = sL,s t+1 ∈ {sL,s U})]
Table 2
Table 3 describes the expected social welfare under σ0 as a function of all the possible signal
realizations in t and t +1 :
(st,s t+1) expected social welfare conditional on σ0 and ht+1
(sH,s H) E [W (2C,ω) | ht−1,s t = sH,s t+1 ∈ {sU,s H}]
(sU,s H) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sL,s U},s t+1 ∈ {sU,s H})]
(sH,s U) E [W (2C,ω) | ht−1,s t = sH,s t+1 ∈ {sU,s H}]
(sL,s H) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sL,s U},s t+1 ∈ {sU,s H})]
(sH,s L) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t = sH,s t+1 = sL)]
(sU,s U) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sL,s U},s t+1 ∈ {sU,s H})]
(sL,s U) V [C,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sL,s U},s t+1 ∈ {sU,s H})]
(sU,s L) V [0,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sL,s U},s t+1 = sL)]
(sL,s L) V [0,Pr(λH | ht−1,s t ∈ {sL,s U},s t+1 = sL)]
Table 3
Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that the expected social welfare under σ and σ0 is identical. This
follows from the fact that (a) the probabilities of observing any sequence of signals is identical
in both tables, and (b) the order in which the signals st and st+1 are observed is irrelevant
34as of time t+2and onwards. Thus, the rows that correspond to signals (st,s t+1)=( si,s j),
si,s j ∈ {sL,s U,s H}, in Table 2 yield the same value function as the rows that correspond to
(st,s t+1)=( sj,s i) in Table 3, respectively.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . The proof is straightforward. Banks should be taxed so that
only those that have observed the highest possible signal will want to provide credit. The
tax/subsidy can be further reﬁned so that the banks’ objective function coincides with social
welfare.
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